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Ola Flaaten and Knut Heen, UiT, The Arctic University of Norway; Thórólfur Matthíasson,
University of IcelandABSTRACT
The difference between the concepts of profit and rent are discussed theoretically and by using aggregated
data from the Icelandic and Norwegian fish harvesting industries. The former is a basic indicator for gauging
the business performance of firms and industries, and the latter is important for the evaluation of the economic
welfare contribution of resources and industries. The importance of distinguishing between profit and rent
is greater for fisheries under strict management control, such as those with quotas and licenses, than those
with more open access. It was found that profit is lower than rent in both countries. Policy implications are
discussed.
Key words: Capitalized rent, invisible resource rent, fishery profit, harvest shares, ITQ, IQ, intra-marginal rent,
licenses, limited entry, transitional gains trap.
JEL Codes: Q22, Q28.INTRODUCTION
In fisheries, as well as in other natural resource-based industries, there is difference between
profit and rent. The former is a basic indicator for gauging the business performance of firms,
while the latter is for the evaluation of the contribution of resources and industry to economic
welfare. Put simply, resource economists are mainly concerned about rent, including pure re-
source rent and producer surplus (intra-marginal rent [IMR]), in natural resource-based indus-
tries, and industry management with the objective of optimizing the sum of rent and consumer
surplus. On the other hand, business economists are mainly concerned about the profitability of
the firms comprising the industry. Fishery managers, politicians, and the industry may be even
more interested in the total income of fishing vessels and crews, thus seeing the opportunity cost
of labor as income rather than cost. This is often the case in Nordic fishery discourse (Nielsen,
Flaaten, and Waldo 2012) and also in the US and Canada (Holland 2011). Consumer surplus on
one hand, and monitoring, control, and enforcement costs on the other, are also positive and
negative contributions, respectively, to economic welfare (Manning and Uchida 2016; Schrank,
Arnason, and Hannesson 2003). In the academic literature, and in costs and earnings studies,
there are not always clear definitions of the profit and rent concepts and their use in actual anal-
yses. This article will mainly discuss and clarify differences and similarities in profit and rent
concepts. Recent data from the Norwegian and Icelandic fish harvesting industries is used in the
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000 | MARINE RESOURCE ECONOMICS | VOLUME 32 NUMBER 3 2017tions where misunderstandings between the two concepts have risen, often due to a lack of ad-
equate data to distinguish between the profit and rent concepts (Hannesson 2013; Heen 2014;
Heen, Heen, and Leung 2014).
In fisheries managed with a mixture of instruments, such as buyback, licenses, individual
quotas (IQs), and vessel group quotas (GQs) that have evolved over time, gauging economic per-
formance development is not straightforward. It has been demonstrated that transferability of
free licenses and quotas will gradually reduce initial industry profitability of a governmental buy-
back or scrapping program (Flaaten, Heen, and Salvanes 1995). Transferable licenses and quotas
given for free to fishers may be efficient in reducing the capacity of the fishing fleet, but they are
not able to secure future above-normal profitability of the industry. The resource rent generated
is made invisible in the accounts of the fishing firms. This may seem as a parallel to the transi-
tional gains trap concept in Tullock (1975), who demonstrated that where a government provides
long-term assistance to an industry in which it wishes to improve income levels, gains for favored
people tend to be transitional. In some cases, fisheries management seems to have fallen into this
type of trap (Nøstbakken 2012; Flaaten, Heen, and Salvanes, 1995). However, while it is true that
there are windfall gains to those whowere gifted fishing rights, fishers who buy quota and licenses
no longer make above normal profit. Tullock’s main concern with the transitional gains trap was
that it locked in (trapped us in) a system with deadweight losses due to cartel power (e.g., of taxi
drivers with medallions). Fisheries are different, as we do not expect to see a deadweight loss as-
sociated with them since they are not limiting output to get monopoly rents (at least generally),
but to generate resource rent. On the other hand, where above-normal profit is expected, lobby
activities to capture this; e.g., to avoid resource taxation and public auction of quota, may take
place. This may be characterised as directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP) (Bhag-
wati 1982).
In this article, we predominantly discuss two hypotheses in order to contribute to the meth-
odology of using accounting data for estimation of rent and profit:
(1) Earnings before tax (EBT) underestimate the natural resource rent in managed fish
harvesting industries.
(2) The commonly used business economic indicator return on capital (ROC) underes-
timates the welfare economic performance of managed fish harvesting industries.
This requires precise definitions of profit and resource rent for a comparison of the differ-
ences in magnitude and for a discussion of whether this matters for bioeconomic and policy anal-
yses. The two hypotheses are further discussed below theoretically, and exemplified by aggregate
data for the national fish harvesting industries of Iceland and Norway.
In the classical fisheries economic model with one-dimensional homogenous effort and a
constant cost per unit of effort, no rent exists in open-access equilibrium (Warming 1911; Gor-
don 1954). Capital and labor are remunerated according to their opportunity costs, which for
the former includes the necessary capital risk premium. A simple change in this model, for ex-
ample by introducing heterogeneous effort, opens it to the existence of rent, specifically IMR, at
open-access equilibrium (Copes 1972). A marginal vessel breaks even and the others may earn
IMR, a concept related to producer surplus in microeconomic theory, and conceptually different
from the concept of resource rent. Note that disentangling IMR and resource rent may be dif-
ficult in actual cases, but at least for open-access fisheries and vessel data it is possible to estimateThis content downloaded from 129.242.187.028 on May 01, 2017 23:34:22 PM
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to IMR quasi-(temporary) rent may also exist (Eide 2016). This article, however, focuses on man-
aged fisheries where we expect that some rent exists; this is termed “resource rent” or just rent.1
CONCEPTS AND METHODS
Accounting principles for fishing vessel firms are much the same as for other firms. However,
since the size and the number of vessels vary significantly, actual bookkeeping practices also vary.
In small-scale fisheries globally, and even for larger vessels in developing countries, owners are
barely required to keep official accounts. For research purposes, data has to be collected on a
case-by-case basis or compiled from different sources.2 In principle, the accounts of a firm can
be itemized, as shown in table 1, where operating revenue from the sale of fish and other marine
species is the main source of income for fish harvesting firms. Variable and fixed costs, as well
as financial revenues, expenses, and taxes, affect the final result. To avoid misunderstanding,
note that purchase of multiannual quotas, be it through auction or other mechanisms, would
be long-term investment, similar to purchasing a fishing boat. Depreciation of rights affects op-
erating profit (EBIT in table 1) (as part of the total operating expenses). In addition, financial
costs of fishing rights affect profit on ordinary activities before tax (EBT in table 1). Thus, both
depreciation and financial costs of fishing rights affect EBT.
Labor cost is a considerable part of the total operating expenses in many fisheries. When the
share system is used, actual crew remuneration may vary across vessels, seasons and locations
(Thuy, Flaaten, and Kim Anh 2013). Vessels generating above-normal profit may, at the same
time, generate above-normal remuneration for their crew members: thus, some resource rent
may be hidden in the income of the crew (see the discussion on Iceland, and footnote 11 for
why above normal crew income is disregarded for Norway).3
Table 1 also includes industry-specific taxes and subsidies. These are included for a compar-
ison of total fishing industry accounts with that of other industries in the national accounts.
Note that when accounts are aggregated across the fishing industry as a whole, lease income
and lease costs will cancel (or almost cancel) out. This is, of course, not the case for individual
firms or group of firms.
ECONOMIC INDICATORS
In addition to calculating profit and rent as absolute figures, they will each also be calculated
relative to another economic variable. The numerator of such an indicator includes an earning/
profit concept, and the denominator can measure either the economic flow or stock. A number
of different indicators could be used in the economic analysis of fishing vessels. As profitability
is the focus of this section, we will discuss two financial indicators that are frequently used to mea-
sure the profitability of fishing vessels (Anonymous 2015, 2006). The profitability of an industry
may vary according to which indicator is chosen, and the choice of indicator is particularly im-1. Estimating each of the different rent elements in e.g. Figures 4 and 6 of Copes (1972) and Manning and Uchida (2016),
respectively, requires more data than available for this article, as far as we can see.
2. Emerging from previous case-by-case research projects, a joint procedure for data collection has gradually been put in place
for European fisheries (Anonymous 2006). For a US example of empirical research based on different sources, see Holland (2011).
For an example from a developing country where cost and earnings data is usually meager, see Long, Flaaten, and Kim Anh (2008).
3. To the best of our knowledge a theoretical discussion of how different combinations of share and management systems
work, as well as the estimation of efficiency and distributional gains within a rent framework, is lacking.
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nical characteristics differ.
The indicator most commonly used in a profitability analysis of fishing vessels is operating
margin (OM) (Anonymous 2015, 2006). OMmeasures the operating profit; that is, earnings be-
fore interest and tax (EBIT), as a percentage of total revenue. The data needed to calculate this
indicator is generally, at least in developed countries rich in fisheries, accessible in official sta-
tistics. OM also provides a reasonably good picture of the profitability of an industry-sector over
time. However, the use of this indicator poses problems in a comparison of vessel groups, indus-
tries, and nations varying in capital structure and other economic characteristics.
ROC, equal to return on total assets (ROA), measures earnings before tax (EBT) plus finan-
cial expenses as a percentage of the average capital invested. This indicator provides information
about the profitability of a project compared to the opportunity cost of the capital. ROC is easy
to understand and useful in comparing profitability between different projects, in our case fish-Table 1. Profit and Resource Rent Definitions in Fisheries Based on Costs and Earnings Concepts
Concept* Explanation
Operating Revenues Mainly from catch of fish and other marine organisms
1 Income from leasing of fishing rights Will be matched by a cost item from another fishing firm. Fishing
rights include licenses, permits, access rights, user rights, and vessel
quotas (VQs, ITQs).
– Total operating expenses Including fuel, labor costs, insurance, maintenance and depreciation
of vessels, and fishing rights.
– Cost of leasing fishing rights Will usually, but not always, be matched by an income item from
another fishing firm. The exception depends on the definition: Is
an idle fisher leasing out allotted fishing rights defined as a fishing
firm or as something else? If not defined as a fishing firm, there will
be a mismatch between lease income and lease costs for the in-
dustry as a whole. Such a discrepancy may also appear in profit-
ability surveys when less than the total population is surveyed.
– Cost of auction-purchased annual
fishing rights
When vessel owners have to acquire annual rights from the resource
owner who could sell or auction time-limited fishing rights (e.g.,
harvest quotas).
– Industry-specific taxes Fishery control activities.
1 Industry-specific subsidies Net p revenue augmenting – cost reducing.
pOperating profit (EBIT) Earnings before interest and tax.
1 Total financial revenues Financial income and currency rate gains.
– Total financial expenses Financial expenses and currency rate losses.
pProfit on ordinary activities before
tax (EBT)
The residual for the private firm before tax.
1 Depreciation of fishing rights Should be included if fishing rights are of limited duration and in-
cluded in total operating expenses, above. This is usually not the
case if they are of unlimited duration.
1 Financial costs of fishing rights Should be included if total financial expenses include financial ex-
penses of fishing rights.
1 Auction income For the resource owner from auction of fishing rights.
– Calculated interests on equity The interest rate should be equal to what the vessels pay on long-term
loans, or equal to the interest yield of government bonds plus a risk
margin.
pResource rent unadjusted (RR1) Resource rent unadjusted for transfer pricing of fish and above
normal labor cost.This content downlo
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ROC is that OM has operating revenue in the denominator, while ROC uses capital. If there
were a constant relationship between sales and capital, both indicators would give the same rank-
ing of the profitability of vessels and groups of vessels; however, this is rarely the case. To avoid
this problem with the use of OM, economists recommend using capital in the denominator in
comparisons of projects and industries.
A general problem in using ROC is determining the value of the total capital or total assets
on the balance sheet. Book values often underestimate assets compared with their true mar-
ket value. This is particularly so if the company has a tax incentive of using a depreciation plan
that differs from the actual reduction in the value of the assets. The focus herein is related to
how fishing rights are reported in the balance sheet and the implications for calculating the
indicators.
The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, as well as an EU analysis (Anonymous 2006), mainly
uses two indicators for measuring the economic performance of the fishing fleet, OM and ROC.
Even though there are some limitations to the application of OM, this has been the main indi-
cator used in the profitability surveys of the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, and a long-term
series is available for this indicator (Anonymous 2015). Iceland has a long history of abnormally
high inflation and negative real-interest rates. Despite this, OM and other measures related to
total income have been routinely applied both by the National Economic Institute and Statistics
Iceland, as the latter assumed the data-collection obligations of the former.4 Time series data for
OM could have been presented for the two countries, but due to this indicator’s weaknesses and
limitations in comparative analyses, it will not be included in this article.
Referring to table 1, the definition of ROC is: ROC p EBT1Financial expensesTotal capital : The ROC indica-
tor (then in %) is used in this article, but it will be distinguished as cases including and exclud-
ing fishing rights. This is the most commonly used indicator and makes comparisons with other
industries and nations possible. This article will, therefore, include profit and rent calculations
for the 2009–2013 period for Norway and Iceland, and these earning concepts will be included
in ROC calculations with and without fishing rights. The economic performance of the fishing
industry will be discussed and compared to other industries. The ROC in the five-year period,
2009–2013, is calculated using two approaches. The first method is the common method of in-
cluding fishing rights, with EBT plus financial expenses in the numerator and total capital in the
denominator. The second method, our method, uses EBT plus both financial expenses and de-
preciation of fishing rights in the numerator and total capital minus the value of fishing rights
in the denominator.
After defining profit and resource rent and the economic indicators, we now return to the
two research hypotheses discussed in the Introduction. The first compares EBT with resource
rent (RR) and claims that EBT underestimates RR. As will be seen for Iceland and Norway, this
is the case when interest on, and depreciation of, fishing rights are greater than the interest on
equity, the owners capital. From table 1 we have the following:
RR p EBT 1 Depreciation of   fishing  rights
1 Financial costs of   fishing  rights – Calculated  interests on equity, (1)
(1)4. See Table 1 in https://hagstofa.is/media/49512/hag_160202.pdf.
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chase of annual quotas from the resource owner, through auction or another way, reduces EBT,
and the payment will have to be added to arrive at RR. This implies that RR 1 EBT when (de-
preciation and financial costs of fishing rights) 1 (calculated interest on equity), and the equity
is positive.
To test the second research hypothesis, we use the concept ROC, including and excluding






EBT 1 Financial expenses 1 Depreciation of   fishing  rights
Total capital – Value of   fishing  rights
: (3)
ROCE includes visible and invisible resource rent and is a better indicator for welfare than
ROCI. Comparing expressions (2) and (3) we see that the numerator in (3) is larger than, or
equal to, the numerator of (2) and that the denominator of (3) is smaller than, or equal to,
the denominator of (2). Thus, the following conclusion holds:
ROCI ! ROCE , (4)
when the value of the fishing rights is positive. As will be seen below, for Iceland the numerator
of (3) has to be adjusted for the transfer pricing of raw fish (1) and vessel labor cost (1).
FISHERIES AND DATA
NORWAY
The main source of data for Norway is the annual profitability survey from the Norwegian Di-
rectorate of Fisheries, which dates back to 1966 (Anonymous 2015). The recent publications by
Armstrong et al. (2014) and Gordon and Hannesson (2015), examples of scientific works based
on data from the Directorate of Fisheries, give further information on the development of the
demersal and pelagic fish fisheries, respectively.
Before 1970, there was free entry into the Norwegian pelagic fish fisheries, with herring,
mackerel, capelin, and blue whiting the most important species for the industry. A moratorium
on the registration of purse seiners was put in place in 1969, and in 1973, a new licensing system
was established (Flaaten, Heen, and Salvanes 1995). The basic principles of the system are still
valid, with first cargo capacity and later quota shares as key parameters. Initially, government
buyback programs helped reduce the number of purse seine vessels, with the aim of assuring
a profitable industry, avoiding biological overfishing, and maintaining reasonable regional fleet
distribution. Since the 1980s, larger coastal vessels have gradually secured more fishing rights. In
2013 a fleet of about 180 vessels had 21% of the landed value of pelagic fish, and 73 large purse
seiners had 67% (Anonymous 2015). In 2013, the profitability survey included 270 vessels in the
pelagic fisheries (Anonymous 2015).
The demersal fisheries were open access up to 1990; however, limited entry for trawlers was
introduced as early as 1938. In 1978, a GQs was introduced for the trawlers, but the conventional
vessels operated relatively freely until 1989. In this year, a resource crisis led to a number of
changes in the fisheries management system with the aim of rebuilding fish stocks. The most
important management measure was closing the fisheries and introducing individual vesselThis content downloaded from 129.242.187.028 on May 01, 2017 23:34:22 PM
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duced, and by the mid-1990s the Norwegian fishing fleet was basically free of subsidies (Isaksen,
Hermansen, and Flaaten 2015).
Since the mid-1990s, various schemes have been introduced to reduce the number of vessels
in demersal fisheries through the transfer of fishing rights and quotas. The trawler fleet quotas
were allowed to be transferred from one vessel to another if one was taken permanently out of
Norwegian fisheries. These quota rights were time limited, but in 2005, they became permanent.
The quotas were again made time limited in 2007. The time limitation is 25 years. In 2003, a
similar program was introduced for coastal vessels over 15 meters, and in 2007 for vessels over
11 meters. From 2007, these transferred quotas were made time limited. The time limitation is
20 years. Twenty percent of the transferred quota was deducted and returned to the common
quota pool of the vessel group. No transferability was allowed between vessel groups, and there
were restrictions on transferability between regions (counties). (For a more comprehensive dis-
cussion of cod fisheries management, see Armstrong et al. 2014).
In Norway, the number of vessels and fishers declined steadily over several decades. A sum-
mary of the statistics on vessels, employment, catches, gross tonnage (GRT), price, and value of
catches is given in table 2 (2009–2013 averages). The total number of vessels in the fisheries was
about 6,300 in 2013, compared with 6,500 and 26,5005 for 2009 and 1980, respectively. The total
number of fishers has also declined steadily over the last few decades, from 34,800 in 1980 to
about 12,500 in 2013. Of the latter, about 80% had fishing as their main occupation.
A problem with using the profitability survey time series is that both the calculation princi-
ples and the categorization of vessel groups by size and gear has changed over time. The last
major revision of profitability studies was made in 2008.6 According to the Directorate of Fish-
eries, the perspective was changed from a welfare economic viewpoint to accounting principles
in business economics. The main change from the 2008 survey is that fishing rights are specified
in the balance sheet, and the depreciation of time-limited fishing rights is specified in the profit
and loss account (Anonymous 2010). The fact that the value and depreciation of fishing rights













Norway 6,281 307,760 12,530 2,349 2,293 0.99
Iceland 1,650 158,090 3,800 1,231 1,175 0.965. This include
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000 | MARINE RESOURCE ECONOMICS | VOLUME 32 NUMBER 3 2017To be included in the profitability surveys, vessels have to meet some specific minimum levels
in regard to size, income, and number of days at sea (Anonymous 2015). Based on these min-
imum levels, the average number of vessels included in the profitability studies for 2009–2013 is
1,610 and average employment is 8,230, which corresponds to about 65% of the total fisheries
employment in table 2. However, the catch of these vessels amounted to 93% of the total fish
landings for these years. While the number of vessels and fishers has declined year by year, as
have the catches from 2010 to 2013, prices of fish and thus the value of the catches shows greater
variation. Due to a price increase of about 75%, the value of catches was nearly 60% higher in
2011, the year with greatest value, compared to 2009.
ICELAND
The main source of data for Iceland is the Profitability in Fishing and Fish Processing Survey,
now published yearly by Statistics Iceland, continuing work initially carried out by the National
Economic Institute. Statistics Iceland utilizes tax returns, providing a comprehensive database,
and the financial statements provided by firms as a supplement to their tax returns. Statistics
Iceland also has access to registry data on industry and the basic technical and economic char-
acteristics of firms.
The current ITQ system in the Icelandic fisheries is based on the Fisheries Management Act
of 1990 and subsequent amendments. At present, the ITQ system applies to 25 different fisher-
ies, which represent about 98% of landed value.7 Initial quota shares were allocated to vessels,
and vessels only, based on their catch history in the previous three years.
Based on stock assessment and scientific advice, the Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture
determines the total allowable catch (TAC) for the next fishing year, which commences Septem-
ber 1st. A valid fishing license is needed to participate in the fisheries. Two main types of licenses
now exist—quota licenses and hook quota licenses—with the latter open only to boats smaller
than 15 GRT using bottom longlines and hand lines.
A third type of license is the coastal license. Small vessels, operated by an active owner, using
hand lines only, can, during the months of June, July, and August, fish almost freely. The only
restriction is a ceiling (GQ) for the catch of cod, which increased from 3,995 tons in 2009 to
8,600 tons in 2015. The coastal license was one of many attempts to alleviate adverse effects, both
psychological and economic, of the collapse of the financial sector in Iceland in 2008. The coastal
license fits badly into the overall management system due to its derby-style characteristics.
In the ITQ system, a clear distinction is made between two types of quotas: TAC shares (per-
manent quotas) and annual catch entitlements (ACE). The ACE of each vessel is the product of
its TAC share and TAC for each species. All quotas are denominated in cod-equivalent terms, as
the cod fishery is by far the most important.8 There is an upper limit of TAC share holdings for
each harvester and the related firms or individuals, varying from 12% for cod to 35% for redfish.
The combined TAC shares of each firm in all fisheries must also not exceed 12% of the total value
of the TAC, measured in cod equivalents. The corresponding ceiling in the hook quota system
is 5%.7. This description is based on Arnason (2005) and Matthíasson and Agnarsson (2010).
8. The cod equivalents are based on the ex-vessel price of a kilo of fish of a given species relative to the ex-vessel price of a kilo
of cod. Thus, holding a given amount of cod equivalents of cod, say, can provide more added value than holding the same amount
of cod equivalents of haddock or saithe, for example.
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of the demersal fisheries, provided quotas are larger than catches in others. This, however, does
not apply to the cod fishery. Up to 20% of quota holdings in most fisheries can be transferred
between fishing years. Finally, should catches exceed quotas in any fishing year, the quota allo-
cation of the subsequent year is simply reduced correspondingly. Overfishing may range be-
tween 3 and 5%, depending on the fishery.
Average and summary statistics (2009–2013) for vessels, employment, catches, GRT, price,
and value of catches for Iceland are given in table 2. The total number of vessels participating
in the fisheries was 1,696 in 2013, compared to 1,582 and 1,449 for 2009 and 1981, respectively.
Contrary to this increase, the total number of fishers declined over the last few decades, from
6,037 in 1980 to about 3,000 in 2013. The statistics do not distinguish between degrees of em-
ployment, but from anecdotal knowledge, the vast majority involve full-time employment.
RESULTS
The data and results for Iceland and Norway for the concepts introduced and discussed in ta-
ble 1, are compared in table 3 for 2013. Leasing fishing rights is excluded due to a lack of data
and since lease income, in principle, should balance lease costs in the total fisheries of each coun-
try. Government auction of fishing rights has not been used in either of the two countries, but
may be of importance in other cases. Industry-specific taxes and subsidies are also excluded
since they are negligible in these two countries today. However, subsidies were quite important
for Norway until about three decades ago. Nowadays the exemptions of environmental taxes,
notably fuel taxes, remain (Isaksen, Hermansen, and Flaaten 2015), but since this is the case











Operating revenue 1,289 100 2,002 100
– Total operating expenses –1,030 80 –1,596 80
– Depreciation of real capital –76 6 –185 9
pOperating profit (EBIT) 183 14 221 11
1 Total financial revenues 0 0 48 2
– Total financial expenses –153 12 –218 11
pProfit on ordinary activities before
tax (EBT) 30 2 43 2
1 Depreciation of fishing rights 0 0 71 4
1 Financial costs of fishing rights 100 8 104 5
– Calculated interests on equity –19 –1 –65 –3
pResource rent unadjusted (RR1) 111 9 153 8
1Adjustment for transfer pricing of raw fish 126 10 0 0
1 Adjustment for labor cost above oppor-
tunity cost 115 9 0 0
Resource rent (RR) 353 27 153 8This content download
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Iceland and Norway, respectively. However, when adjusting for the transfer prices of raw fish
and labor costs above opportunity costs for Iceland, the RR amounts to as much as 27% of the
operating revenue of the fishing fleet. Thus, these two characteristics are very important, but in-
visible, parts of the RR of the Icelandic fishing industry.
A comparison of the data in the different steps in table 3 might enable us to identify other
causes of the difference in the RR. Operating expenses account for 80% of the operating revenue
for both countries; however, the depreciation of real capital differs, at 6% of total revenue in Ice-
land and 9% in Norway. This difference is partly due to the profitability survey’s vessel popu-
lation for Norway, which is somewhat skewed with more large vessels than the total population,
including vessels above 8.0 m only. On average, these vessels have a higher book value and de-
preciation per vessel than the Icelandic vessels. The net financial costs are 12% in Iceland and 9%
in Norway, mainly due to the higher value of fishing rights in Iceland. Subsequently, the profit
on ordinary activities before tax (EBT) as a percentage of operating revenue is 2% in both Ice-
land and Norway.
Depreciation of fishing rights is zero in Iceland, but 4% in Norway because fishing rights in
Iceland are mainly time-unlimited rights, while a large part of Norwegian fishing rights is time
limited, as discussed above. The financial costs of fishing rights are higher in Iceland than in
Norway, however. Overall, the capital costs of fishing rights (depreciation and financial costs)
are 8% in Iceland and 9% in Norway. Calculated interest on equity is 1.4% of total revenue
in Iceland compared to 3% in Norway. RR1 is a bit higher in Iceland (9%) than in Norway (8%).
The following two steps in the calculation of RR in table 3 create a great difference in the RR
on the bottom line and spill over to tables 4 and 5. The first step is an adjustment for the transfer
pricing of raw fish, which in Iceland accounts for 10% of the operating revenue, on average. Ver-
tically integrated fish processing companies do not pay market price for (all of ) the fish and thus
some of the RR may be found hidden in the accounts of the processing companies.9 Our adjust-
ment assumes that if all transactions were at arm’s-length, then the equilibrium price would be
somewhere in between the observed market price and the internally registered price. Such ad-
justments are not necessary for prices in Norway due to the industry structure and legal system
for the first-hand sale of fish. The second step is adjustment for labor cost in Iceland, which
counts for 9% of the operating revenue (table 3). Labor cost per worker was about twice as high
in 2013 in fish harvesting compared to the economy as a whole. There are a number of reasons
for this. Fishers are more likely to be full-time workers than the average worker. Further, they
are away from home and experience more occupation-related hazards than the average worker.
Part of their higher wage is compensation for such differences.
Work in progress by Statistics Iceland, initiated for this article, indicates that a person en-
gaged in fishing earns an hourly wage that is 39 to 50% higher than they (considering explan-
atory variables such as age, education, and sex) could have earned engaged otherwise.10 This is9. The amendment to Act 74/2012, which was confirmed July 10th 2015 (after the completion of this project), fixes the basis
for the catch fee in Icelandic fisheries. The Act prescribes that the base for catch fee levied on fishing firms should include 78% of
profit on ordinary activities before tax (EBT) in land-based freezing firms and 5% of EBT of others processing demersal species.
Also included in the tax base is a quarter of 22% of EBT in meal and oil processing and 25% of EBT in freezing of pelagic species
(capelin and herring). Effectively, the tax authorities are trying to counter the taxational effects of transfer pricing.
10. This research uses both one-way and two-way fixed-effect regressions on data obained from the Icelandic longitudinal
income database (Baum 2006, 220). Variation in the logarithm of hourly wages is explained by commonly used explanatory var-
iables in addition to a binary variable taking the value 1 if the individual is engaged in fishing that year, 0 otherwise. The total
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tion gathered from official registry data (such as tax returns, labor market surveys, industrial
statistics, education attainment, and the national registry). This database is kept and maintained
by Statistics Iceland and has previously been used to estimate returns on education. As there
seems to be more demand for positions for fishers in Iceland than there are positions, and based
on the noted research and arguments, we conclude that 50% of the difference between wages in
the fisheries and other industries is really RR accrued by the fishers due to the lay system, well-
unionized labor, and unexplained social and institutional reasons. In Norway, however, the gen-
eral view is that the remuneration of fishers, on average, is the same as their opportunity cost11
(Nielsen, Flaaten, and Waldo 2012, 77–78 and footnote 11). Thus, there is no adjustment for
this in the Norwegian case. The two adjustments for Iceland are the causes of the great differ-
ences in the bottom line RR in both absolute figures and as a percentage of operating revenue.
For 2013, the RR in Iceland12 accounted for 27% of the operating revenue compared to only 8%
in Norway.
NORWAY
Table 4 provides the average economic performance of the Norwegian fishing vessels surveyed,
using the indicators discussed above: profit (EBT), RR, and ROC. ROC is reported both by in-
cluding fishing rights (ROCI) and excluding fishing rights (ROCE), for reasons discussed above.
ROC for all Norwegian non-financial stock companies is included for comparison.
The EBT for the five-year period is 198 million USD, on average, and within the range of 43
and 405 million USD. The RR is 287 million USD, on average, reaching a maximum in 2011 of
506 million USD and a minimum in 2013 of 154 million USD. The financial costs of fishing
licenses were calculated based on the book value of fishing licenses and permits, and the average
interest rate actually paid for long-term and current liabilities. Calculated interest on equity is
based on the book value of equity and the previous average interest rate paid for long-term
and current liabilities.
RR is higher than profit for all years—45% higher, on average, ROCI is 6.6%, on average,
compared to ROCE of 12.0%, a difference of 5.4 percentage points. RR and ROCE are consid-
erably higher than EBT and ROCI, respectively, for each year and for 2009–2013, on average.
Compared with the ROC for non-financial Norwegian companies, we see that ROCE produced
a higher yield, 12% compared to 9.2% for non-financial companies. This underlines the sugges-dataset covers the period 1998 to 2012. The database consists of information gathered from several official registers, and the num-
ber of fishers in the database is in line with observations from labor market surveys and other surveys (E. Sigurðsson, economist,
Statistics Iceland, personal communication, August, 2016).
11. This is also the view of the authors. In 2013 near-shore vessels below 11.0 m, on average, had an annual remuneration of
the crew (including the owner) of NOK 380,000. Purse seiners, the most profitable fleet segment, on average had NOK 1,199,000
(including captain, mate, and chief engineer), both measured for full-time equivalents (Anonymous 2015). In the on-shore private
sector, unskilled laborers, on average, made NOK 354,000, and skilled laborers with a lower college/university degree made NOK
564,000 per year. A survey among vessel owners (Np219) in Norway (2007) found that none of the purse seiners had experienced
recruitment problems, whereas in coastal “jigging” 12% had experienced such problems. On average, 71% of all vessels had not
experienced recruitment problems (Sønvisen, Johnsen, and Vik 2011). A corresponding survey for 2015 found that 70% of all ves-
sels (Np741) had not experienced recruitment problems, whereas 20% had (J. P. Johnsen, professor, The Norwegian College of
Fishery Science, University of Tromso, personal communication, August 2016). To the best of our knowledge, no fishing vessels
have been unable to fish their quotas due to lack of crew.
12. In Iceland, fishing rent is a potential tax base. Fishery rent estimates corresponded to 5–10% of government tax revenues in
2011, but up to 20% if rent generated in the fish processing industry is included (Matthíasson 2012). This is relatively lower for
Norway, which has important oil and gas sectors.
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companies also includes oil- and gas-related industries. However, there is an industry-specific
resource tax for the oil and gas industries that is deducted from revenue before ROC is computed.
There is no similar resource tax for the fishing industry in Norway. As expected, ROCE is higher
for the fishing industry compared to the average non-financial companies. Profit and ROCI are,
as expected, lower than rent and ROCE.
ICELAND
Table 5 shows profit (EBT), ROC, and RR in the Icelandic fisheries. As for the Norwegian fish-
eries, ROC is reported both including (ROCI) and excluding (ROCE) fishing rights. ROC for all
Icelandic non-financial stock companies is reported for 2009–2011.
Profit for the five-year period is 46 million USD, on average, within the range of –11 and
98 million USD. RR is 391 million USD, on average, reaching a maximum in 2011 of 468 million
USD and a minimum in 2009 of 331 million USD. RR is substantially higher than profit for all
years, 8.5 times higher, on average, and ROCI is 6.5%, on average, compared to the ROCE of







Profit (EBT) ROCI Rent (RR) ROCE ROC
(Millions USD) (%) (Millions USD) (%) (%)
2009 160 6.6 238 11.7 9.0
2010 198 7.1 272 12.1 9.7
2011 405 9.5 506 16.9 9.2
2012 184 5.8 263 10.5 10.2
2013 43 3.8 154 8.7 8.1
Average 2009–2013 198 6.6 287 12.0 9.2T
All use subject to Uhis content downloaded from 1
niversity of Chicago Press Te29.242.187.028 on May 01, 20




(exclusive of fishing rights)
Icelandic Non-financial
Companies
Profit (EBT) ROCI Rent (RR) ROCE ROC*
(Millions USD) (%) (Millions USD) (%) (%)
2009 –11 6.0 331 21.0 6.3
2010 31 6.6 374 22.4 8.2
2011 98 7.4 468 24.5 8.1
2012 82 7.2 431 27.0 n.a.
2013 30 5.1 353 22.0 n.a.
Average 2009–2013 46 6.5 391 23.4 n.a.17
.
* Data for 2012 and 2013 were not yet available from Statistics Iceland at the time of this project.
Sources: Own calculations; data from Statistics Iceland. 23:34:22 PM
journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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for Icelandic non-financial companies, but only for the years 2009–2011. Comparing ROCE and
ROC for non-financial companies, we see that ROCE is substantially higher for all three years,
three times higher than for Icelandic non-financial companies.13 ROCI for each of three years is
lower than ROC for non-financial companies, on average, by about 1 percentage point.
DISCUSSION
The results shown in tables 4 and 5 demonstrate that the common measure of profit EBT un-
derestimates RR for both countries. For these two important fishing countries, the 2009–2013
data thus supports (does not refute) the first hypothesis of this article:
EBT underestimate the natural resource rent in managed fish harvesting industries.
ROCE is also higher than ROCI, which is in line with the theoretical discussion above. The
numerator is higher and the denominator lower for the former than the latter. The difference in
the ROCmeasured by ROCE and ROCI is 5.4 percentage points for Norway and 16.9 for Iceland,
on average. Thus, the second hypothesis also holds:
The commonly used business economic indicator ROC underestimates the welfare economic per-
formance of managed fish harvesting industries.
Compared to the ROC of non-financial Norwegian companies of 9.2 percent, ROCI is 2.6 per-
centage points lower, and ROCE 2.8 percentage points higher. This demonstrates that the eco-
nomic performance of Norwegian fishing vessels is higher than the average non-financial Nor-
wegian company. This may come as a surprise to those who have based economic performance
analysis purely on business economic indicators, such as OM and ROCI. However, it is not a sur-
prise for economists aware of the possibility of invisible RR in closed fisheries managed with li-
censes and other rights (Flaaten, Heen, and Salvanes 1995; Asche, Bjørndal, and Gordon 2009).
At the aggregate level for both countries (including all fishing vessels in the profitability sur-
veys), RR is higher than EBT for each year and on average in the 2009–2013 period. Comparing
the results between Norway and Iceland, we note that the two countries have the same ROCI, on
average, but Iceland has the highest ROCE. Iceland has the most rationalized fishing industry
(Nielsen, Flaaten, and Waldo 2012), and we, therefore, expect the highest ROCE. However, Nor-
way and Iceland have about the same profitability as gauged by the common business economic
indicators above. This was expected, as the ROCs for non-financial firms are much the same in
these countries. Preliminary work by the authors indicates differences between vessel groups in
Norway. Since the value of fishing rights is low, EBT is larger than rent for the small-scale fishing
vessels in the demersal fisheries, including the interest on and depreciation of these rights. The
interest on equity exceeds the interest on and depreciation of fishing rights. Small-scale fishing
vessels (! 11 m) have not been included in the structural programs allowing for transferable
fishing rights; therefore, the book value of fishing rights is very limited.13. Fishing companies are included in the non-financial sector, and the real difference between fisheries and other non-
financial firms is, therefore, greater than shown in this table. Compared to Norway, this is more prevalent for Iceland where fish-
eries are a greater part of the economy, relatively speaking.
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ified in the accounts. This thus includes some of the invisible rent as a rental cost for vessels, un-
less handled explicitly. This was the case in Norway from the early 1970s, when licenses were in-
troduced, until 2008 (Flaaten, Heen, and Salvanes 1995; Anonymous 2010) and in the first decade
of the Canadian sablefish fishery (Grafton 1995). For analysis of investment behavior and capac-
ity adjustment, it is important to distinguish between investment in real capital and immaterial
capital, such as fish quotas and fishing licenses (Nøstbakken, Thébaud, and Sørensen 2011). Some
studies have intentionally distinguished between the two types of capital, but without full success
(Anonymous 2006, 304). If the business costs of immaterial capital are included in the bioeco-
nomic analysis of a fishery, the predicted open-access and optimal-managed industry will both
be distorted.
An additional and very important question is whether it matters for industry profitability and
investment behavior if licenses and quotas are granted free of charge to the first generation of
holders of such rights. This was investigated for Norwegian purse seiners and the answer is pos-
itive: “. . . efficiency gains from introducing tradable quotas are not realized immediately if the
initial quota allocation is based on grandfathering” (Nøstbakken 2012).
Does it matter if the concepts of profit and rent are mixed up and the data does not distin-
guish between real and immaterial capital costs? Yes, it does, for at least two reasons. First, in
analyses of weak regulated fisheries (some limited entry and quota restrictions), real economic
performance will be underestimated when immaterial costs, which include depreciation and fi-
nancial costs of fishing rights, are included as costs. Industry representatives and analysts may
conclude that the need for further policy reform is greater than it actually is. In particular, the
former may even be eager to ask for government intervention to provide short-term relief, such
as subsidies (Sumaila et al. 2010). Second, analysts may get their results partly skewed, exagger-
ating the description of the present rent loss situation in the industry, and overestimate the op-
timal reduction in fishing capacity and the necessary investment in fish stock.
Estimating rents, including IMR, based on company accounts, can only tell us something
about what the rent is, given the structure of the industry and the abundance of fish at the time.
However, it tells us nothing about what the potential rent might be. For this, we need models to
analyze what happens for hypothetical structures of the fishing fleet and abundance of fish stocks.
It is also likely that the costs of monitoring, control, and enforcement will increase in actual fish-
eries under rent generation management, and such costs should be deducted from the (gross)
resource rent discussed herein (Schrank, Arnason, and Hannesson 2003).
In the well-known FAO and World Bank “Sunken Billions” report (Arnason, Kelleher, and
Willmann 2009), capital and other costs for the main analysis were mainly based on the “Eco-
nomic Assessment of European Fisheries” (Anonymous 2006), which includes some capitalized
RR. “The value of fishing rights has not been included explicitly. In some cases it may be implic-
itly in the value of the vessel” (Anonymous 2006, 304). Both Iceland and Norway were included
in this European economic assessment, and in those years the actual agencies did not publish
data that distinguished fully between real and immaterial capital costs (Anonymous 2010; Mat-
thíasson and Agnarsson 2010; Matthíasson 2012). Thus, capital costs may have been exagger-
ated. “Icelandic cod demersal multi-gear, multi-species” in 2005 had a potential “rent loss” cor-
responding to 55% of landed value of fish (Arnason, Kelleher, and Willmann 2009, Table 4.3,
43). Norway was not included in this table. However, the corresponding table in an advanced
edition of the “Sunken Billions” states that “Norwegian trawl” in 1998 had a similar loss of 439%This content downloaded from 129.242.187.028 on May 01, 2017 23:34:22 PM
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seems very high and may have been be distorted for unknown reasons; including the way capital
costs have been calculated, as discussed above.
Policies for generating RR have both efficiency and distributional implications, though econ-
omists are traditionally more concerned about the former. The life of a manager within a Gordon–
Schafer model is quite simple: effort and harvest control are equally efficient at leading to rent
maximization and perfect adaptation; however, introducing extensions such as uncertainty,
multiple cohorts, multiple species, a heterogeneous fleet, imperfect fish markets, seasonal varia-
tions, and economic analysis and management become complex and difficult to handle. It is out-
side the scope of this article to provide a review of all these issues discussed theoretically and em-
pirically in the literature. However, for a recent overview of investment behavior and capacity
adjustment in fisheries, see Nøstbakken, Thébaud, and Sørensen (2011), and for an analysis em-
pirically investigating the basics for perfect adaptation and ITQs, see Nøstbakken (2012), who
demonstrates that actual behavior is not always as efficient as assumed in simpler bioeconomic
models. The type of taxation may impact investment in immaterial assets and investment (real
capital) behavior. The more general literature on natural resources also handles such issues out-
side the theoretical perfect adaptation literature, including unproductive rent seeking (see
Bhagwati 1982; Sachs andWarner 1999; Torvik 2002). Rent, actual and potential, in resource in-
dustries may spur unproductive rent-seeking activities. Even if the profit of a fishing fleet may be
low, we have seen, above, that rent may be high.
DISTRIBUTION OF RENT
RR may be generated in fisheries through different types of policy instruments that are effective
at reducing effort and increasing fish stocks. Instruments include buyback, auctions, licenses,
quotas, and taxes. Rent capture through taxation and resource rental may generate different re-Table 6. Distribution of the Resource Rent
Concept Explanation
Resource rent (RR) See table 1.
1 Former quota/license holders
(vessel owners)
Rent accrues to previous rights holders if they sold their grandfathered
rights (licenses, quotas) “profitably” (cf., Norway, above).
1 Part to present and future quota
and license holders
Rent accrues to the present holders if they only or mainly
grandfathered their rights, or bought “cheaply.” Community quotas
may keep the rent locally.*
1 Crew members’ part Well-organized and/or unionized labor may manage to be paid above
their opportunity cost (cf., Iceland, above).
1 Processers’ part through transfer
pricing of raw fish
Vertically integrated firms may have an incentive to move revenue
from the vessels to the processing plants because of the share system
in the fleet (cf., Iceland, above).
1 Financial institutions Sellers of rights may deposit their financial surpluses in banks that lend
to buyers of rights. This is of importance if the banks are oligopolies
in a thin capital market.
1 Auctions Revenues accrue to the government, or other legitimate resource
owners.
1 Resource taxes Special taxes for the fishing industries (similar to petroleum and hy-
dropower industries).
1 Company taxes Regular taxes for all industries.This content downl
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politicians are, in general, rarely concerned with only the size of the pie, but also its distribu-
tion—within a generation and between generations. For example, Iceland and New Zealand
are among the leading countries using ITQs, but without allowing full international transferabil-
ity. In fact, Iceland does not allow foreign nationals to hold quota rights at all (Flaaten 2010). Ta-
ble 6 gives a brief overview of possible rent distribution among the main groups of recipients in
fisheries.
When resource owners wish to capture rent in rights-based fisheries through resource taxes,
there are several ways of doing so, including quota rental charge, profit charge, lump sum charge,
and ad valorem royalty charge based on quota holding and output price (Grafton 1995). Export
taxes could also be used (Flaaten and Schulz 2010). When interests are deductible from EBIT, this
reduces the net profit and the profit tax more for those who have debt financing compared with
equity financing of vessels (Flaaten, Heen, and Salvanes 1995; Grafton 1995). Both the resource
tax system and the debt-to-equity rate of the firmmay thus affect efficiency and rent distribution.CONCLUSION
This article theoretically discussed why EBT in regulated fisheries usually underestimates RR.
The use of data from the two important North Atlantic fishing nations, Iceland and Norway,
has strengthened the arguments and illustrated differences in the profit and rent concepts found
in the literature.
In the long term, we expect that the ROC, including fishing rights, would be at the level of the
opportunity cost of capital with the same risk. For both Iceland and Norway, ROCI are lower
than ROC for the national non-financial companies. Disregarding differences in risk, this would
imply that the willingness to invest in fishing vessels would marginally decline, and the prices of
fishing rights would fall over time. The investment drivers are not independent of the design of
the fishing rights system, including the initial allocation of rights, as discussed in Nøstbakken
(2012).
The grandfathering of fishing rights could also be called the political fisheries business cycle,
as a kind of parallel to the macroeconomic concept of the political business cycle (Nordhaus
1975). Current government representatives may want to please their constituencies and the in-
dustry by granting rights from privatization (arbitrarily) to the present generation of fishers,
or—to limit them to even fewer fishers—to the vessel owners. Initially, this increases business
economic performance through ROC, but gradually this performance is eroded through the
transferability of rights, implying differences in ROCE and ROCI as demonstrated for Norway
and Iceland in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.
We have argued why it may matter if profit and rent concepts are confused. The underesti-
mation of economic performance is one argument. Another important argument is that analysts
searching for management improvements may have their point of departure partly skewed, ex-
aggerating the description of the present rent loss situation in the industry and the need for a
reduction of fishing capacity and stock increases. This is due to the inclusion of rent elements
in fishing costs. Depreciation and the financial costs of fishing rights may be business economic
costs; nevertheless, they are important elements of RR. This is, however, not an argument against
the rationalization of fisheries, but a warning against the wrong use of concepts and data, which
may have unwanted effects on efficiency and distributional outcome.This content downloaded from 129.242.187.028 on May 01, 2017 23:34:22 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Profit and Resource Rent in Fisheries | 000REFERENCES
Anonymous. 2006. Economic Performance of Selected European Fishing Fleets, Annual Report 2005. EC
Contract Fish/200512–EUR 22277 EN. Luxembourg: European Communities.
———. 2010. Profitability Survey on the Norwegian Fishing Fleet 2009. Bergen: Fiskeridirektoratet. Accessed
April 2015 from http://www.fiskeridir.no/content/download/8416/102928/version/2/file/lonnsomhet
-rapport-2009.pdf.
———. 2015. Profitability Survey on the Norwegian Fishing Fleet 2013. Bergen: Fiskeridirektoratet. Accessed
April 2015 from http://www.fiskeridir.no/content/download/8412/102908/version/2/file/rapport-2013
-web.pdf
Armstrong, C. W., A. Eide, O. Flaaten, K. Heen, and I. W. Kaspersen. 2014. “Rebuilding the Northeast Arc-
tic Cod Fisheries: Economic and Social Issues.” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 5(1):11–37.
Arnason, R. 2005. “Property Rights in Fisheries: Iceland’s Experience with ITQs.” Reviews in Fish Biology
and Fisheries 15(3):243–64.
Arnason, R., K. Kelleher, and R. Willmann. 2008. The Sunken Billions. The Economic Justification for Fish-
eries Reform. Advance Edition. Rome/Washington, DC: FAO/World Bank.
———. 2009. The Sunken Billions. The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform. Rome/Washington, DC:
FAO/World Bank.
Asche, F., T. Bjørndal, and D. V. Gordon. 2009. “Resource Rent in Individual Quota Fisheries.” Land Eco-
nomics 85(2):279–91.
Baum, C. F. 2006. An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata. College Station, TX: StataCorp
LP.
Bhagwati, J. N. 1982. “Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities.” Journal of Political Econ-
omy 90(5):988‒1002.
Charles, A. 2001. Sustainable Fishery Systems (reprinted 2006). Oxford: Blackwell.
Copes, P. 1972. “Factor Rents, Sole Ownership and the Optimum Level of Fisheries Exploitation.” The
Manchester School 40(2):145–63.
Duy, N. N., O. Flaaten, T. N. K. Anh, and Q. K. T. Ngoc. 2012. “Open-Access Fishing Rent and Efficiency:
The Case of Gillnet Vessels in Nha Trang, Vietnam.” Fisheries Research (127–8):98–108.
Eide, A. 2016. “Causes and Consequences of Fleet Diversity in Fisheries: The Case of the Norwegian Barents
Sea Cod Fishery.” http://elementascience.org/article/info:doi/10.12952/journal.elementa.000110.
Flaaten, O. 2010. “Fisheries Rent Creation and Distribution: The Imaginary Case of Codland.”Marine Pol-
icy 34(6):1268–72.
Flaaten, O., K. Heen, and K. G. Salvanes. 1995. “The Invisible Resource Rent in Limited Entry and Quota
Managed Fisheries: The Case of Norwegian Purse Seine Fisheries.” Marine Resource Economics 10(4):
341–56.
Flaaten, O., and C. E. Schulz. 2010. “Triple Win for Trade in Renewable Resource Goods by Use of Export
Taxes.” Ecological Economics 69(5):1076–82.
Gordon, D. V., and R. Hannesson. 2015. “The NorwegianWinter Herring Fishery: A Story of Technological
Progress and Stock Collapse.” Land Economics 91(2):362–85.
Gordon, H. S. 1954. “The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery.” Journal of Po-
litical Economy 62(2):124–42.
Grafton, R. Q. 1995. “Rent Capture in a Rights-Based Fishery.” Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 28(1):48–67.
Hannesson, R. 2013. “Norway’s Experience with ITQs.” Marine Policy 37(January):264–69.
Heen, E. E., K. Heen, and P. S. Leung. 2014. “Conflicting Goals in Fisheries Management: A Study of the
Norwegian Cod Fisheries.” Marine Policy 49(November):73–80.
Heen, K. 2014. “Comment to the Article by R. Hannesson “Norway’s Experience with ITQs.”Marine Policy
44(February):475–77.This content downloaded from 129.242.187.028 on May 01, 2017 23:34:22 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
000 | MARINE RESOURCE ECONOMICS | VOLUME 32 NUMBER 3 2017Holland, D. S. 2011. “Optimal Intra-Annual Exploitation of the Maine Lobster Fishery.” Land Economics 87
(4):699–11.
Isaksen, J. R., Ø. Hermansen, and O. Flaaten. 2015. “Stubborn Fuel Tax Concessions: The Case of Fisheries
in Norway.” Marine Policy 52(February):85–92.
Long, L. K., O. Flaaten, and N. T. K. Anh. 2008. “Economic Performance of Open-Access Offshore Fish-
eries: The Case of Vietnamese Longliners in the South China Sea.” Fisheries Research 93(3):296–304.
Manning, D. T., and H. Uchida. 2016. “Are Two Rents Better Than None? When Monopolies Correct Ill-
Defined Property Rights.” Marine Resource Economics 31(2):141–64.
Matthíasson, T. 2012. “Right Based Fisheries Management in Iceland and Financial Crisis.” Brussels: Euro-
pean Parliament. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2012/474531/IPOL-PECH
_NT(2012)474531_EN.pdf.
Matthíasson, T., and S. Agnarsson. 2010. “Property Rights in Icelandic Fisheries.” In Handbook of Marine
Fisheries Conservation and Management, ed. R. Q. Grafton, R. Hilborn, D. Squires, M. Tait, and M.Wil-
liams, 299–309. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Mincer, J. 1958. “Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution.” Journal of Political
Economy 66(4):281–302.
———. 1974. Schooling, Experience and Earnings. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Nielsen, M., O. Flaaten, and S. Waldo. 2012. “Management of and Economic Returns from Selected Fish-
eries in the Nordic Countries.” Marine Resource Economics 27(1):65–88.
Nordhaus, W. D. 1975. “The Political Business Cycle.” The Review of Economic Studies 42(2):169–90.
Nøstbakken, L. 2012. “Investment Drivers in a Fishery with Tradable Quotas.” Land Economics 88(2):400–24.
Nøstbakken, L., O. Thébaud, and L.-C. Sørensen. 2011. “Investment Behaviour and Capacity Adjustment in
Fisheries: A Survey of the Literature.” Marine Resource Economics 26(2):95–117.
Sachs, J. D., and A. M. Warner. 1999. “The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and Growth.” Journal of
Development Economics 59(1):43–76.
Schrank, W. E., R. Arnason, and R. Hannesson, (eds.) 2003. The Cost of Fisheries Management. Hants (UK):
Ashgate.
Sønvisen, S. A., J. P. Johnsen, and J. Vik. 2011. “The Norwegian Coastal Employment System: What it Was
and What it Is.” MAST 10:31–56.
Sumaila, U. R., A. S. Khan, A. J. Dyck, R.Watson, G. Munro, P. Tydemers, and D. Pauly. 2010. “A Bottom-up
Re-Estimation of Global Fisheries Subsidies.” Journal of Bioeconomics 12(3):201–55.
Thuy, T. T. P., O. Flaaten, and T. N. Kim Anh. 2013. “Remuneration Systems and Economic Performance:
Theory and Vietnamese Small-Scale Purse Seine.” Marine Resource Economics 28(1):19–41.
Torvik, R. 2002. “Natural Resources, Rent Seeking and Welfare.” Journal of Development Economics 67
(2):455–70.
Tullock, G. 1975. “The Transitional Gains Trap.” The Bell Journal of Economics 6(2):671–78.
Warming, J. 1911. “On Rent of Fishing Grounds: A Translation of Jens Warming’s 1911 Article, with an
Introduction,” quoted in P. Andersen 1983. History of Political Economy 15(3):391–96.This content downloaded from 129.242.187.028 on May 01, 2017 23:34:22 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
